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NOTICE
The Indiana Law Journal as well as Professor Bernard C.
Gavit wishes to correct an error appearing in Professor Gavit's
article on "Procedural Reform in Indiana," appearing in the
March issue of the Journal. In Appendix A to the article,
pages 364-365, there is set out a copy of Senate Bill No. 120
together with the minority and majority committee reports on
the said bill. Senator Ralph Adams of Shelbyville, Indiana, was
indicated as one of two senators who signed the minority com-
mittee report and Senator Warren Berkey of Goshen as one of
seven signers of the majority committee report. These reports
should have carried the name of Senator Adams as one of the
seven signers of the majority report and Senator Berkey as
joining in the minority report with Senator Cuthbertson.
COMMENTS
STATE TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENTS ON STOCK OF
DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has of late years been using
increasingly its trusty and adaptable weapon of the 14th Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, in a vigorous warfare against
double taxation. Probably not much has yet been accomplished
against economic double taxation within a single state, but
taxation of the same legal interest by several states has been
increasingly frowned upon. At any rate, it is clear that the
Court is no longer of the opinion, which at one period it often
and confidently announced, that double taxation is in no way
forbidden by the Constitution.1 For example, tangible chattels
are no longer subject to taxation by two or more states.2 The
same applies to intangible assets, so far as such assets consist
of debts. Such assets are taxable only at the domicile of the
creditor.3 And now the Court has carried the same idea still
farther, and it seems almost to its logical conclusion, by holding
1 See Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 732, 23 Sup. Ct. 401 (1903).
2Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (1925). The
same rule applies to corporations. Union Transit Co. v. Kentuky, 199
U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905).
3 See cases cited in notes 10 and 11.
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in First National Bank v. State of Maine4 that the transfer by
the death of the holder of corporate stock cannot constitutionally
be taxed by the state where the corporation is incorporated, but
only by the state of the domicile of the decedent.
In the principal case, the decedent was a resident of Massa-
chusetts. The greater part of his estate consisted of stock of
a Maine corporation. Most of the property of the corporation
was also in Maine, but it is clear that this fact alone would not
permit Maine to tax the transfer.5 However, the state court
sustained the tax, upon the obvious ground that the stock of a
Maine corporation was involved, and the transfer, being only
possible with the permission of the state, was naturally taxable
by it.6
As already said, this decision was reversed and the tax in-
validated by the Federal Supreme Court. The opinion was writ-
ten by Mr. Justice Sutherland; Mr. Justice Stone submitted a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brandeis and Holmes
concurred.
The prevailing opinion admitted that the result reached was
not in accordance with a number of previous decisions of the
Court, but contended that it was a logical and desirable result
of the recently developed doctrine that indebtedness is taxable
only at the domicile of the creditor. The dissenting opinion
pointed out the difference between corporate stock and indebted-
ness, and renewed the protest, which has often been made of
late years, though apparently without much effect, against the
extension of the effect of the 14th Amendment in invalidating
taxation deemed undesirable by the Court. This very protest
emphasizes, however, the firm purpose of the majority to invali-
date, under this conveniently vague constitutional provision, all
taxation deemed by them seriously objectionable from an eco-
nomic standpoint.
The present decision relates only to inheritance taxation. But
there can be little doubt that its principle will be applied to
property taxes also, so that no state except that of the domicile
of the owner will be permitted to tax corporate stock as prop-
erty. While the Court has sometimes intimated, probably only
for the sake of caution, that the rules as to inheritance and
4 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (Jan. 4, 1932).
5 Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256
(1926).
6 State v. First National Bank, 130 Me. 123, 154 AtI. 103 (1931).
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property taxation may not be the same," yet there appears no
reason in principle or in its actual decisions for assuming that
it will be more lenient with the states with respect to property
taxes than it has been when inheritance taxes are concerned.8
In both classes of cases, the property must be considered to be
outside the taxing jurisdiction of any state except that of the
domicile of the owner.
As already said, the Court relies for its new doctrine upon its
older, though still rather recent doctrine, that ordinary debts
may only be taxed at the domicile of the creditor. For a long
time the Court permitted the taxing of debts-or at least some
kinds of debts-at the domicile of the debtor as well as that of
the creditor. 9 But this doctrine is now definitely negatived.
Only the jurisdiction of the creditor's domicile, may tax in-
debtedness or the securities which represent it, and it is imma-
terial that the securities are issued by the taxing state itself or
its municipalities,' 0 or that the securities are kept in the state
of the domicile of the debtor." Thus, double taxation of in-
debtedness, in the sense of taxation of the same indebtedness by
two states, seems definitely at an end.
However, this does not necessarily compel the result of the
case now under consideration; on this point the dissenting opin-
ion is correct. Stock of a corporation is legally quite distinct
from its indebtedness, and while from a practical standpoint
there is considerable similarity, it is far from identity.12 Fur-
thermore, as the Court was constrained to admit, there are many
decisions which squarely permit the taxation of corporate stock
by the state of incorporation, even when the holder is a non-
resident.13 Indeed, there are important cases relating to the
7 See Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712 (1907).
8 See Lowndes, "Basis of Jurisdiction in State Taxation of Inheritance
and Property," 29 Mich. Law Rev. 850.
9 Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903); Wheeler
-u. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607 (1914).
lo Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930). This case explicitly overrules Blackstone v. Miller, supra,
note 9.
"Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930). See also
Beidler v. So. Car. Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
12 In re Lund's Estate, 236 N. W. 626 (Minn., 1931). See also the
principal case in the state court, supra, note 6.
14 Curry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297 (1905); Hawley
v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (1914). Cf. Bullen v. Wisconsin,
240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916).
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validity and effect of inheritance taxation on non-resident
estates, where the only property claimed to exist in the other
state was stock of corporations existing under its laws. 14 In-
deed, as recently as 1931, a litigant, who successfully contested
taxation of the transfer by death of debts owed to a decedent by
a corporation of a state foreign to his domicile, even though all
of the property and business of the corporation was in the state
of its incorporation, did not even protest against the taxation
by that state, of the transfer of the stock itself.15 The present
decision, therefore, even after making all due allowance for the
change of~view which the Court had already shown in the in-
debtedness cases, must be regarded as distinctly revolutionary.
It is submitted, however, that the result is sound and desir-
able. There is, to be sure, serious question of the soundness of
the doctrine that debts are subject to tax at the domicile of the
creditor.16 This is especially pertinent with regard to inheri-
tance taxes, on account of the opportunity to avoid any taxation
at all, because of the doctrine that a state court will not entertain
a suit to enforce the revenue laws of another state.17 But this
possible unfairness is not applicable with respect to corporate
stock, since whatever the state of incorporation loses in power
to tax the stock held by non-residents can usually be made
up by taxing the corporation itself.'8 . It is not surprising,
therefore, that before the actual decision of the principal case,
several students of the subject predicted that the Court would
change its view, as it actually did in this case.' 9
But with all the revolutionary and apparently conclusive de-
14 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2 (1919), involved a
bitter controversy as to the validity of the New Jersey inheritance tax on
non-resident estates; but the only property in New Jersey was stock of
New Jersey corporations. In Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra, note 2, the
Court held that the state of domicile must, in computing the taxable
estate, permit the deduction of inheritance taxes paid to other states in
order to obtain the transfer of stock of corporations organized in these
various states.
15 Beidler v. So. Car. Tax. Comm., supra, note 11.
16 See for a strong argument that debts should be taxable at the domi-
cile of the debtor, Carpenter, "Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of
Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation," 31 Harv. Law Rev. 905.
17 Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921).
18 See Lowndes, op. cit., note 8.
19 See Rottschaefer, "The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles," 15
Minn. L. R. 741, and Pomerance, "The 'Situs' of Stock," 17 Corn. Law
Quart. 43.
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cisions on this subject which have appeared in the last few years,
there are still some unsettled problems. In the first place, it is
not probable that the court means to interfere with the economic
double taxation which exists under the common practice of the
taxing by a single state of the stock of a corporation held by its
own residents, and of the corporation itself.20 There is nothing
unduly burdensome in this; but far worse than the taxation con-
demned in the principal case is the practice of many states of
taxing consolidated corporations on the basis of their entire capi-
tal stock. Since a corporation incorporated in more than one
state is a legal impossibility, the practice amounts to permitting
a state to tax the stock of foreign corporations not doing business
in the state. Yet this very unfair practice has thus far been
approved by the Supreme Court,21 which has intensified the
hardship by permitting the states to require any corporation to
take out a domestic charter as a condition of allowing it to do
business in the state.22  Thus it may be compelled to subject
itself to this ruinous taxation. Here is a situation which crys
far more loudly for a remedy, than that which was relieved in
the principal case.
The question has also been mooted as to whether these tax
cases have any effect on the previously-approved practices with
respect to the settlements of decedent's estates and of garnish-
ments, in both of which debts and corporate stock are treated as
having situs outside the domicile of the stockholder or creditor.
There seems to be no reason to think that there is any necessary
connection between these two classes of cases and the new taxa-
tion doctrines; furthermore the law as to the settlement of
estates is in this particular quite satisfactory.23 On the other
hand, the rule that a debt may be garnished wherever the debtor
can be found24 has been criticised with much justice. So the
Court may desire to change the rule, and, if it does, this new
tax doctrine will be of assistance in rationalizing a change in
the garnishment rule.
20 See Ballantine on Private Corporations, p. 25.
21 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall, 206 (U. S. 1873); Kansas City,
etc. R. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58 (1916).
22 Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440, 51 Sup. Ct. 201
(1931).
23 See Baker v. Baker Eceles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152
(1917).
24 Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (1899);
Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1905).
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It is probable, also, that the new doctrine will not prevent the
states from taxing intangible property of a foreign corporation,
which is definitely connected with business done in the state.
This is a situation where such property (usually good-will or
similar assets) has an actual as distinguished from a merely
legal situs, as is more usually the case with intangibles, because
of the fact that it increases the profitableness of the business
done within the taxing state. Such a tax, therefore, seems en-
tirely proper.25
But the most important -question left unsettled by the prin-
cipal case and its predecessors is whether or not the "business
situs" doctrine is still accepted. This doctrine is that a state
may tax directly, or impose an inheritance tax with respect to,
intangible property, either debts or stock, owned by a non-resi-
dent but used by him in carrying on business within the state
levying the tax. So long as there were somewhat continuous
business activities, as distinguished from mere isolated transac-
tions, the Court has clearly and repeatedly sustained the tax. 26
The doctrine involves double taxation, as the state of domicile
or incorporation is permitted, to tax the same property.27 But
as an original question, the cases now under consideratfon,28
since they were not considered to involve continuous business
activities, do not seem to affect this principle.
The doubt as to the present status of the business situs doc-
trine arises from the fact that in all of these late cases the
Court referred to the doctrine and explicitly declined to pass
upon it. In at least one of them,29 the state taxing authorities
urged, and it seems with much force, that the doctrine was
applicable, because the decedent was carrying on business in the
state; but the Court held otherwise. In the principal case, the
Court, with real if perhaps unconscious irony, stated that the
25 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305; 166 U. S.
185, 17 Sup. Ct. 604 (1897). The same doctrine was applied in the case
of an individual taxpayer, in Citizens Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 42 Sup.
Ct. 15 (1921).
26 The leading case is New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup.
Ct. 110 (1899), but there are several other cases to the same effect.
27 Fidelity, etc. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40
(1917); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928). See
also Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 40 Sup. Ct. 558
(1920).
28 The principal case, and the cases cited in notes 10 and 11, supra.
29 Beidler v So. Car. Tax Comn., supra, note 11.
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question must be reserved until an occasion "when, if ever, it
properly shall be presented for our consideration." 30 Obviously,
if the Court never finds an occasion for the application of the
business situs doctrine, the doctrine itself is as good as dead.
Therefore, while it is not safe to say that this business situs doc-
trine is no longer accepted, one may properly express great
doubts of its continued application.
But subject to the possibility, though extreme improbability,
of a further change of view by the Court, the doctrine of the
principal case seems to definitely settle the law on this point. An
owner of stock of a foreign corporation may be confident that
he will not be subjected to a tax with respect thereto by the
state of incorporation, and that his estate will be similarly im-
mune from inheritance taxation by the same state, with respect
to such stock. Most lawyers will probably welcome this new
doctrine; but all must shudder when they think of the numerous
and complicated tax proceedings, which they have conducted, as
it now turns out, uselessly, and even more at the recollection of
the millions of dollars which they have permitted their clients
to pay to states which the Supreme Court now decides had no
authority to collect a penny.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
30 52 Sup. Ct. 178.
